Game of Thrones

It is at times like this, I would cheerfully vote for Tyrion Lannister to become the next Prime Minister. Possibly even Ramsay Bolton: at least there’s a politician who knows how to get things done.

Like most of you I went to bed on Thursday (actually the early hours of Friday morning) reasonably confident that this country would vote narrowly to remain in the European Union, and learnt shortly after breakfast, that it, had, in fact voted to leave. Or rather, just over half of it had. The other half are now hopping mad, in the belief that they have, in one way or another been had.

I then watched the Prime Minister impale himself on the sword of his own political imprudence, and leave the political mess for someone else to clean up. In a few short hours, the political landscape and comforting familiarity of the pan political consensus on Europe, had shattered forever. Even Donald Trump bobbed up later on, telling some bemused Scots, how he admired them for taking back their country.

The consequences of this vote remain to be seen: will there be a renegotiation and a hurried second referendum? Will the government fall with the Prime Minister, and there be a general election, with a major political party promising to remain in Europe? Will Scotland leave the Union with its MPs, with England and Wales then facing semi-permanent Tory government?

Who knows? I don’t. What I have found interesting, is the reams of print legal commentators have pushed out in the last few days, about how this, that or the other area of law will be adversely affected by Brexit.

After a while, one’s eyes glaze over: because no one of course, can predict at this early stage precisely what is going to happen. In particular, although one might think that whilst eg: European Union procurement lawyers may yet become an endangered species, it is salutary to note that many other jurisdictions have procurement laws, derived from common law principles, which have nothing to do with the EU. So procurement lawyers are likely to evolve rather than die.

Similarly in town and country planning and environmental law, although one fears the demise of the Blue Flag scheme, with the banners being lowered over Britain’s beaches, or the EU protected bird species such as woodlarks and nightjars, ending up in a pie on Boris Johnson’s table, many of those laws are now so established and so beneficial to the public good, that they may well be kept, subject to some subtle relabeling.

So what does this mean for costs which after all is the focus of this blog? I think I can venture two predictions, with a degree of safety. The first is that the current plans for fixed costs in NIHL, clinical negligence or more generally, across civil litigation, or the agenda to raise the small claims track limit or abolish whiplash, are unlikely to proceed. I just think that costs reform has, in Mr Obama’s memorable phrase “gone to the back of the queue”.

The second is that without a functioning Legal Aid system, and without widespread ATE, with astronomical court fees and a failing tribunal system, now, just when the citizens of this country are likely to need access to justice acutely as their rights and laws are refashioned in the biggest legal shake up for a generation, the legal armoury is bare.

Stripping away the European Court of Justice and the law making role of the EU which is heavily grounded in human rights concerns, must serve to weaken the rule of law.

What worries me, is that with a divided and incoherent domestic legislature the prospect of domestic strengthening of the rule of law, to replace that which will be lost, seems very remote indeed.

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Mr Cameron: he was no Nick Fury.

Rule Britannia

The text of this article first appeared in the June 2016 issue of Litigation Funding.

At the time of writing, the referendum on whether this country should remain in the European Union or not, is some 6 weeks away. Every day, the respective camps for leaving or remaining, tempt the uncommitted voter with the prospect of millions of Albanians, Serbs and Turks moving to the United Kingdom should we remain, or the delights of being part of a free trade area with Montenegro and the Ukraine, as the de facto 51st  state in President Trump’s America. It’s going to be a tough one to call.

This year in January, Jackson LJ set forth a vision for a scheme of fixed costs to apply to all money claims worth up to £250,000, with a prediction that such a scheme, could, if the political will were present, be implemented before the end of 2016. But because this is a referendum year, that seems most unlikely.

The intended consultations on fixed costs for the limited classes of NIHL claims and clinical negligence have not taken place, as the Ministry of Justice goes into lock down and concentrates on the referendum, in peculiar circumstances where the Lord Chancellor is on the other side of the political divide to the Prime Minister.

In such circumstances, it does not seem fanciful to suggest that if the country votes to leave the European Union, the Ministry’s efforts for the next 20 years will be spent uncoupling the country’s laws from the European Union and all interest in fixed costs proposals and similar schemes, will just fall of the political agenda.

It follows in turn that the financial interests of litigation lawyers will be served by voting for Brexit, the costs tail wagging the constitutional dog. But should the country leave the European Union will also become decoupled from not only European Union jurisprudence, but also the comparative jurisprudence of the other member states, including Germany, whose legal system enjoys a much greater incidence of fixed costs than our own, and whose influence is clearly to be seen in the proposals for fixed costs in the vast majority of civil cases.

If the country votes to remain in the European Union, and if, a comprehensive scheme for fixed costs is introduced in England and Wales (that is two pretty big ifs) it follows that it would be instructive to consider what the German experience, over the last one hundred and fifty years has been and what lessons might be learnt for our own jurisdiction.

In volume two of the Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report published as long ago as May 2009, Jackson LJ noted how the regime of fixed fees, originally introduced in the 19th century in the German courts worked:

2.3   The quantum of legal costs that a successful party is entitled to recover from an unsuccessful party, and the fees and expenses of the court which are payable, are prescribed by statute. These rules do not seek to provide a successful party with a complete indemnity for his or her legal fees. Instead, they provide for the payment of legal fees and court costs in scales which increase in a degressive, non-linear fashion and with the use of multipliers that vary according to the value of the dispute, the stage at which the case is resolved, and other aspects of the case. Illustrations are given below of how these rules apply to disputes of varying sizes, in respect of the amount payable by the unsuccessful party (leaving aside that party’s own legal fees, which it must bear).

Amount in dispute = €10,000

Court fees payable €588.00
Lawyer’s fees payable (for one lawyer) €1,869.37
Total payable by unsuccessful party €2,457.37

Amount in dispute = €100,000

Court fees payable €2,568.00
Lawyer’s fees payable (for one lawyer) €5,123.07
Total payable by unsuccessful party €7,961.07

Amount in dispute = €1,000,000

Court fees payable €13,368.00
Lawyer’s fees payable (for one lawyer) €16,900.85
Total payable by unsuccessful party €30,268.85

These fees represent the scale applicable in 2004; it is interesting to note that they represent a small proportion of the amounts in dispute, and far smaller sums than one would anticipate being spent to litigate, substantial claims in this country. They also have a particular policy underpinning them. They are intended to ensure cross subsidisation of the legal profession with larger cases, “carrying” smaller cases, within the same lawyer’s caseload. As Jackson LJ put it:

A notion which underpins the cost scales used in Germany is that of “cross-subsidisation” which, in summary, posits that a lawyer may earn a reasonable living out of his or her profession by accepting a number of smaller cases where remuneration under the scale of fees is not very great (and there may be only a small profit margin) and in addition accepting a number of medium or large cases where the scale fees are higher. If a lawyer’s practice consists of a mix of small, medium and high value cases, the theory is that the fees from the medium and large value cases will “cross-subsidise” those derived from smaller ones, enabling the lawyer overall to earn a reasonable living.

This is a familiar concept to the English and Welsh regimes of fixed costs known as “swings and roundabouts”, but whereas such a system reflected the German legal profession, when introduced in the time of Bismarck and the Kaisers, it is creaking under the strain of changes in the legal profession and practice of Germany in the 21st century, including an increase in the size of law firms, increasing specialisation, and the fact that smaller firms, undertaking smaller claims, find it difficult to attract and undertake the larger claims which should be cross-subsidising their caseload.

In recent years, contingency fees have also been declared to be lawful in Germany, which increases the scope for lawyers to make “own client” charges, which cannot be recovered from the unsuccessful losing party.

It is interesting to note however, why fixed costs have been used by Germany on such a large scale. They are seen as integral to the vision of “access to justice” held in that country.

The use of cost scales is regarded by the courts as beneficial, as their application gives effect to a central value enshrined in the German constitution, being the “rule of law”. The rule of law requires not only that there should be free access to the courts, but that litigation costs should be both predictable and reasonable. It also requires the German legislature to ensure that access to the courts does not depend on the economic situation of an individual. One of the ways in which the legislature ensures access is by offering legal aid to people who meet the relevant criteria for such funding.

Context however is everything. Although Germany has an adversarial, rather than inquisitorial system of courts, there are features of the German system, which are very different from our own: there is no process of disclosure, no exchange of witness statements, cross examination is limited, experts are appointed by the courts, and interlocutory processes are devoted to eliciting what are the relevant issues and disputes, so that the final trial can be very short, rarely lasting more than a day. And with truncated court processes, most cases in the Local Courts run from commencement to final hearing in just over 4 months, and in the Regional Courts just over 7 months.

The key point to note here, surely is that if costs are fixed, at a level, which is below the sums in dispute, as a quid pro quo, then the amount of work that the court, and the substantive law requires must be reduced, to ensure that it remains feasible for a lawyer to complete it within the scale of fixed costs and still make a profit.

A corollary of a large scale comprehensive scheme for fixed costs across the bulk of civil litigation, has been the effect on the legal expense insurance market in Germany, which is unrecognisable in its extent to a lawyer in England and Wales. Such policies are also far more expensive than the modest premiums charged for BTE insurance in the UK.

The Interim Report also noted some research called the Soldan study, which revealed that whilst 35% of litigation was funded in Germany, by legal expenses insurance, in the United Kingdom only 4% of litigation was:

What is evident from the Soldan study is the significant role that legal expenses insurance plays in Germany when compared with England and Wales. It is common for individuals in Germany to take out legal expenses insurance to cover their legal fees in the event that they are involved in litigation, whether as a claimant or a defendant. Legal expenses insurance covers individuals for costs according to the statutory scale. The advantage to insurers is that the scale of costs makes the extent of the insurer’s exposure predictable. The widespread use of legal expenses insurance is seen as the driver of the widespread use of cost agreements according to the cost scales. It is difficult for lawyers whose clients are covered by legal expenses insurance to negotiate an individual fee agreement for remuneration at a rate above the applicable scale.

From these points, some conclusions seem to leap off the page. Should a scheme of fixed costs be introduced in England and Wales, along the lines of Jackson LJ’s proposal, it could well cause, a restructuring, and fragmentation of the legal profession.

Secondly, such a scheme would have to march hand in hand with some fairly radical streamlining and cost cutting of the litigation process, with cherished exercises such as disclosure, being ruthlessly curtailed, if not eliminated. Thirdly, such a scheme might be blunted through the rise of irrecoverable own client charges, a concept inherent in the current principle of proportionality. Finally, although such a scheme would undoubtedly reduce a lawyer’s remuneration on individual cases, it might, just might, through encouraging litigation by making it more affordable, not only increase access to justice, but give opportunities to the cannier lawyers to gain more work too through an explosion of new claims.

A PDF of the article can be found here: PDF file

 

Malkinson v Trim and the sole practitioner

From time to time, solicitors pause from fighting like lions on behalf of their clients and need to go into battle on their own account, either pursuing a debt collection against their former clients who have had the ill grace not to pay their bills, or in some other context.

In such cases, an issue sometimes arises, as to what is the measure of costs, and in particular, the hourly rate that can be recovered when a solicitor is litigating his or her own case, as opposed to acting for someone else.

The starting point is that since 1884, and the seminal decision in London and Scottish Benefit Society v Chorley (1884) 13 QBD 872 a solicitor has been able to recover his full costs, in litigation rather than be regarded as a litigant in person, as a special concession due to the peculiar position of being a solicitor. That is a principle which was preserved in the old RSC.

The important question was whether it survived the introduction of the CPR on 26th April 1999. The Court of Appeal declared that it did in the important decision of Malkinson.v.Trim [2002] 1 WLR 463, where the then rule 48.6(6) and section 52.5 of the Costs Practice Direction were interepreted to mean that the common law rule in Chorley had survived the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.

In the case of Zakirov.v Newmans [2012] SCCO Master Leonard an inventive attempt was made to argue that the decision in Malkinson, was per incuriam. This was rejected by Master Leonard.

That that principle survives the introduction of the CPR was expressly confirmed by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Malkinson v Trim. The point is simply one of interpretation, and the correct interpretation of the CPR 48.6, in the light of CPD 52.5, is summarised by Chadwick LJ (at paragraph 22):

‘As I have sought to point out earlier in this judgment, the basis of the principle that a solicitor who acts for himself in litigation is entitled to compensation, by way of costs, for his time and trouble is a recognition that he (in common with any other litigant) ought to be indemnified against the expense to which (on the hypothesis that he has been successful in the litigation) he has been unjustly put. The special position of a solicitor is that he does not need to employ others to provide professional skill and knowledge in the conduct of litigation. He can provide that skill and knowledge himself. Further, there is no difficulty in measuring what it costs him to do so; and there is a potential saving in costs if he is not discouraged from doing so. One effect of CPR r 48.6(6)(b), read in conjunction with section 52.5 of the Practice Direction, is that there is now more clearly recognised a distinction between the solicitor litigant who provides, in connection with his own litigation, professional skill and knowledge in the course of his practice as a solicitor-that is to say, who “is represented … by himself in his firm name”—and the solicitor litigant who provides skill and knowledge in what might be described as “his own time”—that is to say, outside the course of his practice as a solicitor and (typically) outside the office. The latter is treated as a litigant in person for the purposes of CPR r 48.6, and so is subject to the restrictions imposed by that rule, including the two-thirds restriction imposed by paragraph (2). The former is not. Nor is there any reason, consistent with the need to provide an indemnity, why he should be. Further, there is no reason, consistent with the need to provide an indemnity, why he should not recover the cost of providing professional skill and knowledge through employees of his practice’.

Mr William’s interpretation of CPR 48.6 (6)(b) as applying to all solicitors in all circumstances, says Mr Mallalieu, is one interpretation, but not the only one. The interpretation offered by Chadwick LJ is not per incuriam: it is the correct interpretation as well as the generally accepted interpretation and should be applied.

Master Leonard rejected the challenge in these words:

The distinction between a solicitor acting on his own behalf and a solicitor represented by his firm is not merely hypothetical, nor confined to procedural matters. For example a partnership of solicitors, if sued, will normally, by virtue of section 5A of Practice Direction 7A, be sued and defend in the name of the firm. However that name will represent the partners in the firm at the time the cause of action accrued. If the same firm of solicitors appears on the court record for the defendants, some of the partners in the firm as currently constituted may be defendants and some not.

It would seem to follow, on the Claimant’s interpretation of the rule, that the defendant partners would be litigants in person if no there have been no changes in the partnership since the cause of action accrued. If there have been changes, then any retired partners would not be litigants in person. Continuing partners would be litigants in person unless any new partners have joined, in which case (being represented by someone in addition to themselves) there is room for argument about whether they are or not. If they are then, unlike the former partners, their recoverable costs will be capped by CPR 48.6(2).

My conclusion is that the application of the rule is meant to be simpler, and more obviously fair, than that. A solicitor is a litigant in person, like any other litigant in person, if he is on the court record as acting for himself. If the record shows that he is represented by a firm of solicitors, he is not. That is the case whether or not he is a partner in or employee of the firm on the court record.

I respectfully agree with Chadwick LJ’s interpretation, which was not per incuriam. The Costs Practice Direction does no more than clarify the position by pointing out the significance of the words ‘acting for himself’ in CPR 48.6(6)(b).

Post April 2013, the rules have been amended yet again, so that apparently there is a surprising lacuna, in respect of sole practitioners due to the use of the word “partner” which might suggest that sole practitioners now can no longer claim their full hourly rate. The question then, is whether the rules have fundamentally changed, or changed so that they apply save where for example, a firm of solicitors with 2 partners represents one of them. The new rules provide:

(6) For the purposes of this rule, a litigant in person includes –

(a) a company or other corporation which is acting without a legal representative; and

(b) any of the following who acts in person (except where any such person is represented by a firm in which that person is a partner) –

(i) a barrister;

(ii) a solicitor;

(iii) a solicitor’s employee;

(iv) a manager of a body recognised under section 9 of the Administration of Justice Act 19851; or

(v) a person who, for the purposes of the 2007 Act, is an authorised person in relation to an activity which constitutes the conduct of litigation (within the meaning of that Act).

There is no suggestion in any material I have seen, such as the Explanatory Notes to the amending statutory instrument, or a consultation, or guidance from the SRA that there was any intention to change the existing law.

Indeed, the retention of the “firm” exception above, would point the other way. I think that the true construction which would apply in this situation, is that sole practitioner would not be acting as a litigant in person at all, per Chadwick’s formulation and Master Leonard’s explanation and rule 46.6 simply does not apply, with its limiting case of the requirement that there be representation by a firm, of which the solicitor is a partner.

Otherwise I think that as this is technical legislation, using words of art, known to and understood by the solicitors profession, that references to “a firm” and “a partner” when properly construed, are words which embrace this situation, of a sole practice and a sole principal.

I am strengthened in this view by the definitions under the Glossary in the Solicitors Handbook, which of course are made under rule 23 of the Solicitors Code of Conduct, itself made under the Solicitors Act 1974.

The glossary provides the following definition of what a “firm” is:

(i) save as provided in paragraphs (ii) and (iii) below, an authorised body or a body or person which should be authorised by the SRA as a recognised body or whose practice should be authorised as a recognised sole practice (but which could not be authorised by another approved regulator); and for the purposes of the SRA Code of Conduct and the SRA Accounts Rules can also include in-house practice;

(ii) in the SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules:

(A) any recognised body (as constituted from time to time); or

(B) any solicitor or REL who is a sole practitioner, unless that sole practitioner is a non-SRA firm; or

(C) any partnership (as constituted from time to time) which is eligible to become a recognised body and which meets the requirements applicable to recognised bodies set out in the SRA Practice Framework Rules and the SRA Authorisation Rules, unless that partnership is a non-SRA firm or an Exempt European Practice;or

(D) any licensed body in respect of its regulated activities;

whether before or during any relevant indemnity period;

(iii)in the SRA European Cross-border Practice Rules, means any business through which a solicitor or REL carries on practice other than in-house practice.

Thus it can be seen that for the purposes of the law established by the Solicitors Act 1974, a “firm” does not have to be a partnership, but can be a sole practice. In such a firm there can never be a partner, but there is of course a principal.

Later in the glossary a definition of a principal is:

(i) subject to paragraphs (ii) to (iv) means:

(A) a sole practitioner;

(B) a partner in a partnership;

(C) in the case of a recognised body which is an LLP or company, the recognised body itself;

(D) in the case of a licensed body which is an LLP or company, the licensed body itself;

(E) the principal solicitor or REL (or any one of them) employed by a non-solicitor employer (for example, in a law centre or in commerce and industry); or

(F) in relation to any other body, a member of its governing body;

(ii) in the SRA Authorisation Rules, SRA Practice Framework Rules and SRA Practising Regulations, means a sole practitioner or a partner in a partnership;

(iii) in the SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules means:

(A) where the firm is or was:

(I)a sole practitioner – that practitioner;

(II)a partnership – each partner;

(III)a company with a share capital – each director of that company and any person who:

(01)is held out as a director; or

(02)beneficially owns the whole or any part of a share in the company; or

(03)is the ultimate beneficial owner of the whole or any part of a share in the company;

(IV)a company without a share capital – each director of that company and any person who:

(01)is held out as a director; or

(02)is a member of the company; or

(03)is the ultimate owner of the whole or any part of a body corporate or other legal person which is a member of the company;

(V)an LLP – each member of that LLP, and any person who is the ultimate owner of the whole or any part of a body corporate or other legal person which is a member of the LLP;

(B)where a body corporate or other legal person is a partner in the firm, any person who is within paragraph (A)(III) of this definition (including sub-paragraphs (01) and (03) thereof), paragraph (A)(IV) of this definition (including sub-paragraphs (01) and (03) thereof), or paragraph (A)(V) of this definition;

(iv)in the SRA Indemnity Rules, means:

(A)a solicitor who is a partner or a sole solicitor within the meaning of section 87 of the SA, or an REL who is a partner, or who is a sole practitioner, or an RFL or non-registered European lawyer who is a partner, and includes any solicitor, REL, RFL or non-registered European lawyer held out as a principal; and

(B)additionally in relation to a practice carried on by a recognised body or a licensed body alone, or a practice in which a recognised body or a licensed body is or is held out to be a partner:

(I)a solicitor, REL, RFL or non-registered European lawyer (and in the case of a licensed body any other person) who:

(01)beneficially owns the whole or any part of a share in such recognised body or licensed body (in each case, where it is a company with a share capital); or

(02) is a member of such recognised body or licensed body (in each case, where it is a company without a share capital or an LLP or a partnership with legal personality); or

(II)a solicitor, REL, RFL or non-registered European lawyer (and in the case of a licensed body any other person) who is:

(01)the ultimate beneficial owner of the whole or any part of a share in such recognised body or licensed body (in each case, where the recognised body or licensed body is a company with a share capital); or

(02)the ultimate owner of a member or any part of a member of such recognised body or licensed body (in each case, where the recognised body or licensed body is a company without a share capital or an LLP or a partnership with legal personality).

And it can be seen, therefore that for the purposes of the Code of Conduct, the position of a sole practitioner and a partner, are equated as the principals of their various firms. It follows that there are reasonable grounds for suggesting that despite the slipshod wording in the CPR, the law has not changed after all.

 

Bad bargains

In recent years there has been a growing tendency to consolidation in the personal injury marketplace, with many firms and their caseloads being acquired in whole or in part by other firms. The contexts in which this process has been occurring are legion.

Firms may have decided to cease doing personal injury work because of the reforms made by LASPO 2012, they may have dissolved due to the breakup of a partnership, sadly, some of them may have entered into an insolvency situation, due to a rising costs base and declining revenues.

The acquiring firm will wish to know what the value of the business is that it is acquiring or at the very least, the value of the work in progress of the cases that it is purchasing. Such a purchase is always inherently risky, but I would identify that there are a number of particular types of risk, which are peculiar to the personal injury market, and which at the current time are perhaps under appreciated by the purchasers of law firms.

Risks can be identified to arise from three particular sources. The first is the risk arising from clients who wish to challenge the amount of costs that they have agreed to pay to their own lawyers, a particularly pertinent consideration in a regime of solicitor-own client success fees paid out of damages. This deserves a post of its own.

I note with unease that many firms of solicitors regularly and by default charge a 100% success fee, as a matter of course, without regard to whether this can be justified on the facts of a particular case, whether it constitutes an item of unusual costs, and whether the client is giving informed consent with the requirements of rule 2, of the Code of Conduct firmly in mind.

Risks lying quiescently in the files from this quarter, may serve both to decrease the ostensible value of the work in progress and raise the spectre of litigation or complaints, consuming precious time and resource in dealing with disgruntled clients, the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the Legal Ombudsman.

The second source of risk, is the risk arising from inter-partes costs challenges made by paying parties: in a real sense those solicitors who make a living from personal injury litigation, do so by reason of the miscalculation of insurers whose failure to identify and settle all claims at a pre-litigation stage generate significant costs for claimants’ lawyers.

The insurers in turn will utilise all available arguments to decrease the amount of costs claimed by lawyers, including challenges to the solicitors retainer and its enforceability.

Judging the prospect of success on inter partes costs challenges is itself an art. The principal argument in this respect at the moment, is the ongoing doubt as to the assignability of conditional fee agreements, but there are refinements to this argument relating both to the unwitting termination of conditional fee agreements by incautiously worded letters and the construction of artificial principal-agent relationships, to seek to circumvent the stringencies of LASPO 2012.

The third and the most dangerous area, relates to the regulatory risk, that a solicitors business model, may infringe the Code of Conduct, leading to action by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, with disciplinary sanctions being pursed before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. An obvious area of risk, relates to the referral fee ban, and the acquisition of cases.

In this respect, many solicitors still take cases from claims management companies(CMCs), under “LASPO compliant marketing agreements”: but do so in the context of clients who have signed up to Damages Based Agreements (DBAs) with the claims management companies.

This can be no more or less than a transparent attempt to circumvent the referral fee ban, with instead of the solicitor paying the client a fee out of costs, the client paying a fee out of damages. The solicitor may also have agreed to send the CMC a cheque for 25% of the relevant heads of damages.

Such an arrangement is problematic in the extreme. It seems reasonably clear under the Damages Based Agreements Regulations 2013, that the only fee a client is liable to pay a CMC is up to 25% of the appropriate heads of damages, net of the costs the client receives from the paying party.

It matters not that the costs accrue to the solicitor, rather than the CMC. In most cases, this will mean that no fee is due at all to the CMC. A solicitor who fails to spot this, advise the client of the position or even worse send a cheque to the CMC does so at his peril.

Moreover a solicitor may not turn a Nelsonian blind eye, to the client’s agreement with the CMC, taking the view that this occurred before his instruction and is none of his business, but is under a duty to advise a client of the nature of the agreement and his obligations.

The sad cases of Beresford and Smith, where solicitors failed to do so and whose relationships with claims management companies were pored over and found wanting, are instructive and on point: the decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal can be found here: 9666-2007 – Beresford & Smith and the High Court decision upholding the Tribunal’s decision can be read here: Beresford v Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal High Court.

Although the Solicitors Practice Rules have been swept away and replaced by the Solicitors Code of Conduct, I do not think it is the case that the regulatory requirements have eased in the years since this case: far from it, if anything the regulatory net is likely to tighten further both for solicitors and CMCs who will shortly be regulated by the FCA.